

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for China

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: China

1. Analysts attending the monthly meeting found little in the past several weeks to change their assessments of recent months. Potentially troubling situations remained on the horizon, but analysts generally agreed that little had occurred to make potential threats immediate.

2. Sino-Soviet Affairs

There was general agreement that the talks in Moscow had accomplished little or nothing, that suspicions remained high on both sides of the table, and that both parties were maneuvering for immediate (and often petty) advantage in the opening round of what were likely to be marathon talks. There was no sign of give in the Chinese position, which with its emphasis on the Soviet presence in Mongolia and Vietnam offered absolutely no attraction to the Soviets. Most analysts believed, however, that Chinese reassessment of long-standing strictures against "revisionism" (and specifically throwing into ideological disrepute a series of vituperative attacks on Moscow issued when the Sino-Soviet dispute went public in the early 1960s) was potentially of considerable importance and over a long period of time was likely to affect the nature of the relationship. A few analysts thought this development largely irrelevant, and all agreed that the geopolitical element of the dispute had long been more important than the ideological dimension. After some discussion analysts generally concluded that recent Soviet deployments in Mongolia did not drastically change the balance along the border or presage military action against China, nor did they suggest a major change in the wider context in which the military balance could be viewed.

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3. Indochina Situation

Analysts took note of the continuing Vietnamese offensive in western Kampuchea as well as the somewhat heightened rhetoric on the part of both China and Vietnam regarding alledged border violations, but concluded that the overall situation generally remained static. There was general agreement that the Chinese had not positioned themselves so that they could accept with some equanimity the virtual destruction of the Pol Pot forces (so long as a few tattered remains existed somewhere in the country). Most analysts thought that the Vietnamese would avoid major, prolonged incursions into Thailand in the course of the current offensive, but there was general agreement that such incursions, if they occurred (and particularly if they resulted in significant clashes with Thai troops) could lead China to attempt to teach Hanoi a second "lesson." There was a general consensus that Beijing hoped to avoid this alternative, and most analysts believed that China did not have to make a decision at this point. Several participants noted, however, that the Vietnamese offensive naturally could bring that decision-point closer.

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